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Abstract.  As  a  result  of  its  hurricane  exposure,  Florida  is  probably  the  part  of  the 
industrialised world most prone to natural catastrophes. Over the last 20 years the Florida 
legislator has tried to maintain a situation, where the private insurance sector plays a major 
role in providing hurricane-insurance. Its attempts to keep such insurance affordable have, 
however, led to a situation, where the public sector still ends up bearing a large part of the 
risk.  Drawing  on  the  experience  of  various  European countries  with mandatory  state  run 
catastrophe  insurance  schemes,  we  argue  that  the  cost  of  hurricane  insurance  for  the 
population could be substantially reduced, if Florida created a similar institution. The massive 
reduction in sales costs, loss adjustment costs and general administrative costs would allow 
such a  system  to  work  with  premiums  that  are  on  average  25%  lower.  The  problems  of 
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0 Introduction  
 
 
A house-owner in the county of Monroe (southern tip of Florida, c.f. the map in Appendix 1) 
with a house worth $400’000 on average pays a property insurance premium of more than 
$12’000 per year. The cost of property insurance is thus about the same as the cost of health 
insurance  for  a  four  person  household  in  Switzerland.  The  situation  in  Monroe  is  no 
exception.  The  average  premium  rate  is  typically  of  this  order  of  magnitude  for  most 
properties in southern Florida situated near the Atlantic coast. It is thus hardly surprising that 
in a 2006 survey Florida property owners named “rising property insurance costs” as their 
biggest concern. (For obvious reasons falling property prices have since taken the first spot).  
 
One might be tempted to argue that the high cost of insurance is just a logical consequence of 
the “irresponsible” behaviour, which consists of building houses in hurricane prone areas such 
as the Florida coast. It is therefore worth emphasising that the Florida insurance industry is in 
large  part  responsible  for  this  “irresponsible”  behaviour.  Just  20  years  ago  the  property 
owners on the Florida coast paid only about 3’000 dollars a year for their insurance. The price 
signal  potential  house-owners  got  from  the  insurance  market  was  thus  quite  clear:  The 
additional risk of building near the coast is quite low and well worth the amenities such a 
location has to offer. However, over the last 20 years Florida has experienced a number of 
(costly) hurricanes and the insurance industry has reacted by massively increasing the cost of 
property insurance (premiums, deductibles etc).  
 
It seems reasonable to argue that the property insurers should be better informed about the 
potential cost of hurricanes than any of the other market participants. Their premium policy is 
thus at least partially responsible for the fact that Floridians (arguably) built too close to the 
coast and/or did not apply sufficiently severe building standards.  
 
This being said, it is of course true that the insurance industry cannot possibly (in the long 
run) survive, if it has to charge premiums that do not cover its expected claims costs. A 
massive increase in claims costs due to hurricanes must therefore inevitably lead to higher 
insurance premiums. Any attempt (e.g. by the government) to limit such premium increases 
are in the long run doomed to fail since somebody (either the property owner or the taxpayer) 
must ultimately foot the bill. This argument is certainly correct, if one talks about premium 
increases that are of the same order of magnitude as the increase in expected claims costs.  
 
The current situation in Florida
1 is, however, very different. The property owners in the high 
risk areas close to the Atlantic coast must pay additional insurance premiums that are about 
three times higher than the expected additional claims costs they generate. The best way to 
illustrate this is to compare the insurance rates in the county of Monroe with the expected 
claims costs in that county.  
 
According to the Florida Public Hurricane Loss Model (FPHLM) the expected claims costs 
per $1’000 insured are about $9 higher in Monroe than in the inland counties. The average 
insurance premium in Monroe is however $28 higher than in the less exposed counties.  
 
                                                
1 This paper is a follow-up paper to Jametti and von Ungern-Sternberg (2009) “Hurricane Insurance in Florida” 
which gives a much more detailed discription of the current institutional set-up.    3 
If we translate these numbers back into the $400’000 property we mentioned in the first 
paragraph, we come up with the following orders of magnitude. The average annual premium 
in Monroe is around $12’000, in the less exposed counties it is $1’200. The owners in Monroe 
must  thus  on  average  pay  $10’800  more  per  year.  Of  this  $10’800  in  additional  annual 
premium $3’600 are due to the higher expected claims costs, which leaves a difference of 
$7’200 that still has to be explained. 
 
As mentioned above,  the  situation in Monroe is  by no means exceptional. The orders  of 
magnitude are the same  all along the Atlantic coast of Southern  Florida. However, other 
highly exposed counties (like Miami-Dade, Broward or Palm Beach) have a substantial part 
of their building stock located further inland. Since the average premium data available are by 
county, the very high premiums paid by the coastal inhabitants are diluted by the buildings 
inland. As a result the average county premiums do not reflect the high premiums the property 
owners near the coast have to pay even in those counties. The specificity of Monroe is that 
most of the buildings there are located close to the sea. As a result the Monroe premiums are a 
good indicator of the premiums the coastal inhabitants in other counties have to pay.  
 
So far we have talked only in terms of the insurance premium paid by an individual house-
owner. The following example may help to get a feeling of the order of magnitude these 
higher insurance premiums mean for the population as a whole: If one focuses just on the 6 
counties  with  the  highest  average  premium  rates  (Monroe,  Miami-Dade,  Broward,  Palm 
Beach in the South and Gulf, Franklin in the Panhandle), and the personal residential owner 
occupied houses, the owners are each year paying $1’500 million more in property insurance 
premiums,  because  their  hurricane  exposure  is  higher  than  the  average  for  the  whole  of 
Florida. Their expected claims costs are higher “only” by about $1’000 million. Just for these 
6 counties, the premiums the owners are paying the insurance companies over and above the 
higher expected claims costs they generate is thus of the order of $500 million per year. Note 
that most of these additional costs are borne by the owners near the coastal regions. As one 
moves further inland hurricane losses decrease, both because storm surge (flooding) is no 
longer  a  problem  and  because  the  hurricanes  progressively  lose  their  power.  Insurance 
premiums fall accordingly.   
 
In spite of the fact that the additional premiums for the high risk customers are substantially 
higher  than  the  expected  claims  costs  they  generate,  the  private  insurance  companies  in 
Florida complain that they will have to leave the market unless they are given the possibility 
to impose still further premium increases. If this argument is taken seriously it would indicate 
that insuring properties in Monroe (and other high risk areas) imposes additional costs on the 
insurance companies that are twice as high ($7’200 vs. $3’600) as the additional expected 
claims costs. Potential candidates for such costs might be: higher commissions to their agents, 
higher  administrative  costs  (due  to  high  screening  costs?),  higher  cost  of  obtaining  risk 
capital, higher reinsurance costs etc.  
 
These  observations  are  important  for  several  reasons.  First  Florida  has  created  a  public 
insurance  company  (Citizens),  which  was  initially  intended  as  a  “residual  insurance 
mechanism” but which has by now grown to be the biggest property insurer in Florida. A 
large part of its portfolio consists of properties in the high risk areas. Its commercial success 
and  high  market  share  are  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  insuring  these  high  risks  at  lower 
(affordable)  premiums  than  the  private  insurance  market.  The  private  insurance  sector  is 
pushing hard to reduce the importance of Citizens and to bring it back to its initial role of a 
“residual  market  mechanism”.  The  premium  and  cost  data  above  strongly  indicate  that   4 
Citizens might well be able to provide hurricane insurance at much lower premiums than the 
private insurance sector and nevertheless be economically viable, if it just managed to keep 
these “additional costs” at a (substantially) lower level than the private companies.  
 
Second, the very high costs for the private sector of insuring catastrophic risks like hurricanes 
in  Florida  raise  the  question  whether  it  might  not  be  possible  to  organise  the  hurricane 
insurance  market  in  Florida  differently,  save  a  substantial  part  of  these  costs  and  thus 
massively reduce the insurance premiums for the average Floridian.  
 
There are good reasons to believe that the answer might be yes. Hurricanes and other forms of 
natural  catastrophes  are  typically  referred  to  as  “uninsurable  risks”  i.e.  risks  where  the 
standard mechanism of risk spreading does not work as efficiently as with other risks.  
 
Several  European  countries  (Switzerland,  Spain,  France,  Germany)  have  long-standing 
experience  in  providing  insurance  cover  against  such  catastrophic  risks  using  different 
insurance solutions, in which the public sector plays a predominant role. The most efficient 
solution has turned out to be the creation of a mandatory state-owned (and run) insurance 
scheme, which provides property insurance for certain types of risks
2.  
 
One of the major advantages of such a solution is best illustrated by looking at the Consorcio 
de Compensacion de Seguros in Spain. The Consorcio insures all properties in Spain against a 
wide range of catastrophes. One of the specificities of the Spanish system (which was created 
in the aftermath of the Civil war) is that the Consorcio covers both natural catastrophes and 
damage due to civil unrest (including terrorist attacks). The cost structure of the Consorcio is 
simple: It pays the private insurance companies 5% of premium income as a commission for 
collecting the premiums and keeping the files on the individual customers. The Consorcio has 
direct contact with the customers only once a loss has occurred. From the perspective of the 
customer this 5% commission is very favourable. In the private property insurance market 
insurance sector, the sales representatives typically get to keep 15% to 20% of the annual 
premium. The justification for the low commission rate is simple: Since the insurance cover 
offered by the Consorcio is highly standardised and mandatory, the agent has no particular 
sales effort to make. There is thus no reason to pay him a high commission. The Consorcio’s 
own operating costs (including claims settlement) absorb a further 5% of its premium income.  
Over the last 20 years at the Consorcio commissions and administrative costs thus absorbed a 
mere 10% of premium income. If one takes the example of Monroe described above at face 
value, it would seem to suggest that of the average additional premium of $28/$1000 insured, 
the Florida insurance companies claim to spend around $20 per $1’000 insured (i.e. around 
to 70%) on various kinds of costs (other than claims payments).  
 
The example of the Consorcio seems to indicate that the home-owners in Florida might be 
able to benefit from massive cost savings if Florida implemented a well designed insurance 
scheme, in which the state played an important role.  The purpose of this paper is to analyse in 
greater  detail  the  premium  reductions,  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  introducing  a 
mandatory state run hurricane-insurance scheme in Florida.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 1 we discuss the data used in this 
paper.  Section  2  provides  a  cross-section  analysis  of  insurance  premiums  and  expected 
hurricane loss costs for the different counties in Florida. Section 3 estimates the costs savings 
                                                
2 C.f. von Ungern-Sternberg (2004) for a detailed discussion of the institutional arrangements in these countries.     5 
that might be expected from introducing a mandatory state run hurricane insurance scheme in 
Florida. Section 4 discusses various other aspects of such an institutional change. Section 5 




1 The data  
 
 
We  will  use  a  cross  sectional  approach  to  study  how  premiums  in  the  Florida  property 
insurance market increase with expected loss costs.  
 
A Premiums  
 
The Wharton School has recently published an ambitious book on catastrophe insurance
3. In 
the chapter devoted to hurricane insurance it calculates average “Homeowner Insurance Rates 
per $1000 by County” in Florida for the years 1997 and 2006. The Table is reproduced in 
Appendix 2.  
 
As  the  authors  correctly  point  out,  there  is  a  wide  variety  of  reasons,  why  the  average 
premium  rate  might  vary  form  one  county  to  the  next.  Differences  in  the  intensity  of 
competition, differences of cover, differences in the choice of deductible, differences in the 
average value of properties etc could all be expected to have some effect on the average 
county insurance rates. All other things being equal, one would however expect insurance 
premiums to increase with the degree of hurricane exposure. For the purpose of this study we 
will focus on the average premium rates for the year 2006.  
 
 
B Loss Costs 
 
A number of institutions calculate hurricane loss models that have to be submitted to the 
Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology in order to be approved and 
certified. The Commission checks the models carefully, as these are the models that are used 
by the insurance companies to justify their insurance rates and premium increases. A list of 





Since major hurricanes are (very?) low probability events and hurricane loss prediction is still 
far from being an exact science, it is hardly surprising that these models sometimes produce 
quite divergent results.  For the purpose of this study we base ourselves on the Florida Public 
Hurricane Loss Model (FPHLM). Of all the model submissions, it is the most transparent 
(public) in the sense that the authors actually publish the key assumptions on which their 
model is based. The other models use much more of a “black box” approach. 
  
The  model  produces a variety  of  expected  loss  cost  estimates,  depending  on  the  type  of 
insurance contract chosen. In practice, by far the most frequently chosen option (close to 60% 
                                                
3 Wharton Risk Management and Decision Process Center (March 2008) “Managing Large-Scale Risks in a New 
Era of Catastrophes”  henceforth referred to as the “Wharton study”   6 
of all contracts
4) is the 2% deductible. We thus focus on the loss cost predictions for policies 
with a 2% deductible.  
 
As  regards  the  owner-occupied  properties,  the model  produces  2  kinds  of  loss  estimates, 
depending on the type of construction: one for “frame” buildings and one for “masonry” 
buildings. The share of these different kinds of structures is very different among counties. In 
particular the high risk counties on the Atlantic coast have a substantially larger share of 
masonry buildings than the inland counties. There is a variety of reasons for this (date of 
construction, average income or wealth  of owner etc), but the extent of hurricane risk  is 
probably also an important explanatory factor. Masonry buildings are less vulnerable than 
frame constructions. In the rich hurricane exposed coastal counties along the south Atlantic 
coast, like Florida, Broward and Palm Beach over 90% of the buildings are masonry. In 
Monroe the rate is still 65%. In certain inland counties it drops to as low as 25%.  
 
The loss data used in this study are a weighted average of the “frame” and masonry” loss 
projections, the weights being the share of these different kinds of building in each county. 
(The data are reproduced in Appendix 3). 
 
 
2 Cross-section Analysis of premiums and expected claims cost per county  
 
Fig. 1 gives a scatter plot of average insurance premiums and expected loss costs for the 
different counties. One notes (unsurprisingly) that there is a strong positive relationship. To 
obtain a first indication of the rate at which insurance premiums increase with the expected 
cost of hurricane damage in Florida, one might start off by running a simple linear regression 
of the premium rate on the expected hurricane loss costs.  The result is:  
 
Premium = 1.8 + 1.8*Cost      R
2
adj  = 0.58   MSE = 2.3 
             (0.40)  (0.18) 
 
 
                                                




The  slope  coefficient  of  1.8  (standard  errors  in  brackets)  indicates  that  on  average  the 
premium rate increases by $1.8 when the expected loss cost increases by $1. 
 
Even a cursory look at the plot of residuals shows, however, that the linear regression is mis-
specified.  For low levels of hurricane risk, the premium does not rise much faster than the 
expected costs. For high expected hurricane costs the opposite is true. As a result the premium 
rate in county Monroe lies far above the linear regression line. A simple way to capture this 
non linear relationship between average premiums and expected hurricane costs is to perform 
an exponential regression:   
 
The result is:  
 
Premium = 2.3 + e
(0.35* Cost)     R
2
adj = 0.91    MSE =  1.05 






The interesting feature of this non linear specification is that it clearly shows that the premium 
increases  much  more  rapidly  as  one  moves  from  the  “low  risk”  counties  to  highest  risk 
counties like Monroe or Miami-Dade.   
 
When one takes a closer look at the scatter plot, one notes that the counties on the northern 
Gulf coast (Gulf, Franklin and Walton) have much higher premiums than their expected loss 
costs (according to the FPHLM) would seem to warrant. The loss estimates for these counties 
seem  quite  reasonable,  given  that  these  counties  have  not  suffered  any  severe  hurricane 
damage in the last decades. The high premiums are thus hard to explain. One should note, 
however, that other models estimate much higher loss costs for these counties. According to 
these  models  the  high premiums are  thus entirely justified. The point deserves emphasis, 
because  it  illustrates  the  uncertain  nature  of  the  models,  projections  and  forecasts  one 
necessarily has to work with.  
 
 
3 The savings-potential of a state-run hurricane insurance scheme.  
 
  
According to various sources (including the Insurance Information Institute, an institute close 
to and funded by the private insurance industry) premiums have increased much faster than 
loss  costs  in  the  US  property  liability  insurance  market.  As  a  result  the  average   9 
Claims/Premium ratio (also called loss ratio) has been of the order of only 65% over the last 
20 years








There is no reason to assume that the ratio should be higher in Florida. To the contrary: as we 
have seen from the premium analysis in section 2, the private insurance industry requires 
much higher margins to cover hurricanes in the high risk areas.  
 
However, to be on the conservative side, let us from now on work with a benchmark in which 
we assume that the private insurance sector would aim at a loss ratio of 60% (i.e. the trend 
average for 2007)
6.   
 
As mentioned in the introduction we have several decades of experience from Spain and other 
countries (notably Switzerland and Germany) that mandatory state run insurance schemes can 
operate with much lower administrative costs. In the case of the Spanish Consorcio, the sales 
and administrative costs (including loss adjustment costs) amount to a mere 10% of total 
premium income. Since the empirical evidence from both Germany and Switzerland
7 goes in 
the  same  direction,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  a  mandatory  hurricane  insurance 
scheme in Florida should be able to operate with a similar cost structure. (See section 4 for a 
more detailed discussion of this point). 
 
                                                
5 Source: “Property/Casualty Insurance in 2008 : Overpriced Insurance and Underpaid Claims Result in 
Unjustified Profits, Padded Reserves, and Excessive Capitalisation” J. Robert Hunter, Consumer Federation of 
America 
6 A marginal loss ratio of 0.6 means that the premium should increase by $1.66 when the expected loss increases 
by $1. According to the simple linear regression in section 2, the average premium in Florida increases by $1.8 
when the expected loss cost increases by $1. This comforts us in our belief that the approach we are using is 
quite conservative.  
7 C.f. von Ungern-Sternberg (2004)    10 
Let  us  assume  now  that  Florida  introduced  such  as  system  and  calculates  the  average 
premiums in the following way: 75% of the premium income is used to cover expected loss 
costs, 10% of premium income is used to cover sales and administrative costs and 15% of 
premium income is used to accumulate reserves and/or purchase reinsurance cover.  
 
Since the loss ratio of this scheme would be 75%, it would be 15% higher than the 60% the 
private insurance industry works with. Alternatively formulated, a first immediate beneficial 
effect for the home owners would be that their average premium rate would fall by 15%.  
 
Second, the mandatory insurance scheme would dispose of 15% of annual premium income to 
buy reinsurance and/or constitute reserves.  
 
Presented in this fashion, one might get the impression, that something must be wrong with 
the numbers. It looks too much like the kind of “all gain no pain” situation politicians often 
promise when election time is close. 
 
The main reasons why such a massive reduction in the insurance premiums is indeed possible 
are to be found in the cost savings generated by a mandatory purely state-run solution. In the 
short run the most important ones are the savings in commissions, loss adjustment costs and 
general overhead expenses. 
 
 




First and foremost, as mentioned above the Consorcio pays only 5% of the annual premium 
income to the private sector in return for collecting the premiums and keeping the files of the 
customers. If the customer uses an insurance agent, the 5% commission is split between the 
agent and the insurance company).  
 
In  a  market  environment  the  private  insurance  companies  typically  pay  their  insurance 
representatives 15 to 20% of the premium each year in the form of commissions.  
 
The much lower commissions of the state run insurance scheme are justified, since the  agent 
does not have to provide any kind of advice or consultancy services. The Consorcio offers 
only one (highly standardised) contract, in which the degree of coverage, the deductible etc 
are fixed. The insured value is equal to that for which the other types of coverage are bought. 
The  insurance  agent  cannot  even  advise  the  customer  whether  to  take  out  catastrophe 
insurance or not (it is mandatory).  
 
From the perspective of the insurance agent adding cover against catastrophes to the property 
insurance contract thus requires roughly the same amount of effort as adding on the sales tax. 
Just as there is no reason for the sales representative to keep 15%-20% of the sales tax, there 
is  no  justification  for  him  to  obtain  any  substantial  share  of  the  catastrophe  insurance 
premium.  
 
This being said, one can expect strong political opposition from the insurance agents to the 
introduction of any such scheme. Their revenues would be (severely) curtailed.  
   11 
A.2 Loss Adjustment Expenses (LAE) 
 
The US insurance industry claims that its average loss adjustment costs for property liability 
insurance are of the order of 12% of premium income. This is huge in comparison with the 
state run property insurance schemes in Spain and Switzerland, which spend substantially 
less than 5% on LAE. In the absence of more detailed information, one can only speculate as 
to the origin of this huge discrepancy. Two possible explanations immediately spring to mind.  
 
First, the insurance companies take some of their general overhead costs and put them under 
the heading “Loss Adjustment Costs”. This makes the “Loss + LAE as a fraction of premium 
income” statistics they prefer to publish look more attractive (higher).   
 
Second the private insurance companies may be more inclined to try to take their customers to 
court in order to reduce claims payments. These legal costs are then accounted for under the 
heading “LAE”. 
 
A.3 General Overhead Costs  
 
Private insurance companies spend substantial amounts on advertising and other forms of 
customer  acquisition.  They  also  have  the  tendency  to  not  only  pay  their  management 
excessive salaries but also provide them with costly fringe benefits. The recent “workshop” 
organised by the management of AIG in a luxury resort to decide on how best to spend the 
billions they had  just received from  the  government as  part of a bail-out plan, put these 
practices into sharp perspective. Since the mandatory state run schemes are (by definition) 
mandatory, customer acquisition is no longer an issue. This leads to substantial savings of 
marketing  and  sales  costs.  The  general  overhead  costs  of  the  state  run  schemes  are  also 
substantially lower. These cost savings can be passed on to the customers in the form of lower 
premiums.  
 
B Reserves  
 
The first few years after creating a large scale catastrophe insurance scheme are of course 
always critical. If Florida were to be hit by a large hurricane shortly after the inception of the 
scheme, it would not have sufficient reserves to cover its obligations. At this stage, all we are 
interested in is the question, at what rate the scheme would be able to accumulate reserves. In 
the next section, the issues involved will be discussed in greater detail.  
 
Obtaining a rough first estimate of the rate at which the scheme would on average be able to 
accumulate reserves is straightforward. According to the FPHLM the expected annual loss for 
the owner occupied houses is of the order of $2.4 billion per year. Given the assumption of a 
loss ratio of 60% this implies that the schemes annual premium income is around $4 billion 
per year. 15% of this amount, i.e. $600 million per year, are thus available to accumulate 
reserves and/or purchase reinsurance.  
 
To avoid misunderstandings it should be emphasised that the $600 million per year are not 
the  maximum  amount  that  could  potentially  be  spent  to  purchase  reinsurance  cover.  If 
reinsurance rates were fair (in the sense that the premium is roughly equal to the expected 
claims cost) the scheme could in principle purchase 100% reinsurance. The $600 million p.a. 
is thus the amount that can be spent on reinsurance to cover that part of the premium that is 
over and above the expected claims costs.    12 
 
Since it is likely that the scheme would purchase some reinsurance cover, it is difficult to 
make any  predictions over and  above  this first rough estimate. Furthermore, since strong 
hurricanes tend to be low probability high cost events, the rate at which reserves would in fact 
be accumulated, is likely to deviate substantially from any prediction one could produce, 
depending on whether the first few years have high or low hurricane activity.  
 
In the long run, however, experience shows that the interest income the state run schemes can 
earn on their reserves end up being substantial. These incomes are then passed on to the 
customers in the form of further premium reductions. 
 
 
4 Discussion.  
 
In the preceding section we have limited ourselves to providing a rough first approximation of 
the kind of cost savings a mandatory state run hurricane insurance system might generate for 
the home owners. The purpose of this section is to provide a more detailed discussion of the 
main economic issues involved.  
 
A The mandatory nature of the scheme 
 
In the current situation the home owners can to a certain extent chose whether they wish to 
buy cover against catastrophes or not, and if they do what type of contract (deductible) they 
opt for. In practice, of course, the degree of freedom is not all that large because adequate 
insurance  cover  against  hurricanes  is  usually  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  obtaining  a 
mortgage  loan.  Even  for  those  home-owners  who  do  not  require  a  mortgage,  the  risk  of 
having  ones property totally  destroyed  is too  large, and some  kind of  insurance cover is 
typically bought.  
 
This being said, the introduction of a mandatory hurricane insurance scheme is undisputably a 
reduction  in  the  house-owners  freedom  of  choice.  Since  in  practice  a  large  part  of  the 
population opts for the 2% deductible, it would seem natural, that the mandatory insurance 
scheme also chose this solution.  
 
There is, of course, nothing in principle to prevent the house-owners from buying private 
insurance to cover (reduce) this deductible, if they so wish. In practice the high transactions 
cost of providing such cover would essentially price it out of the market.  
 
The  mandatory  nature  is  unfortunately  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  making  the  hurricane 
insurance scheme financially attractive.  
 
As mentioned above, one of the major cost savings of the scheme is that it allows the state 
insurance companies to work (almost) without sales agents. In Switzerland the public cantonal 
property insurance providers spend nothing on sales agents, in Spain the private insurance 
industry gets just a 5% commission for doing the paperwork with their customers. On the 
private property liability insurance market sales commissions typically make up between 15% 
and 20% of annual premiums.  
   13 
One could not, of course, expect the sales agents to work for such a low commission, if they 
did in fact have to provide the customers with sophisticated advice on which type of cover 
best suits their needs. Hence the need to provide just one highly standardised contract.  
 
The huge cost savings obtained by making the system mandatory can be further illustrated by 
looking at the National Flood Insurance program (NFIP). When devising this system, the 
legislator decided it should be optional. The NFIP thus depends on the sales efforts of the 
private insurance industry and their sales agents to sell their cover.  
 
Over the period 1968-2005 the private insurance industry has kept a total of 30% of the 
premium income collected, i.e. $7.4 billion, just for the role of financial intermediary they 
play. All of the risks of the program (including the “Write Your Own” WYO policies) are 
borne entirely by the public sector
8. The $3 billion deficit the program accumulated prior to 
the  2005  hurricane  season  is  thus  in  large  part  due  to  the  excessive  commissions  which 
continue to be paid to the private insurance industry. Unfortunately the program officials 
know full well that their attempts to expand the coverage of the program depend critically on 
the sales efforts of the insurance agents. And, as the numbers show, these do not sell their 
services  cheaply.  The  basic  trade-off  for  the  NFIP  is  thus  the  same  as  for  the  hurricane 
insurance program. Does the policy maker wish to leave the program optional, which means 
that the premium level has to be about 25% higher; or does he take the additional step of 
making it mandatory, thus permitting a premium reduction of around 25%.  
 
The mandatory nature of the program also has the advantage of eliminating the problem of 
adverse selection. One of the reasons general administrative costs of the private insurance 
companies  are  so  high,  is  that  they  devote  substantial  resources  to  risk  screening.  In  a 
mandatory system the insurer by definition covers all the risks and the costs of risk screening 
disappear.  
 
In summary, the cost savings that result from this streamlining of the system are substantial, 
but the reduction in the freedom of choice for the customers is undeniable. 
 
  
B Claims settlement 
 
 
As mentioned above, the state run insurance schemes in both Spain and Switzerland have 
massively lower claims settlement costs than the private insurance companies in the US. The 
benefits to the customers are, however, much larger than the substantial cost differential might 
suggest.  The  state  run  insurance  schemes  do  not  have  a  profit  motive.  There  are  no 
shareholders  whose  dividends  might  be  increased  if  they  managed  to  reduce  the  claims 
payments they make to the victims of a disaster. There are thus good a priori reasons to 
assume that their claims settlement policy will differ substantially from that of the private 
insurance sector. An interesting study recently tested this hypothesis empirically. It studied 
the degree of customer satisfaction in three countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland) that 
were  hit  by  the  same  heavy  rainfalls  and  floods  in  August  2005.  The  best  results  were 
obtained by the mandatory system in Switzerland, both as regards the amount (fairness) of the 
claims payments and the speed with which the claims were settled
9.   
                                                
8 C.f. the Wharton Study p. 89 f.f. 
9 C.f. Präventionsstiftung der kantonalen Gebäudeversicherungen (2009), „Alternative Finanzierungs-und 
Versicherungslösungen.“   14 
 
 
In the US the dissatisfaction with the private insurance companies’ claims settlement practices 
seems to be increasing quite rapidly.  The bitter recent debates as to the question whether the 
destruction of a house was caused by the hurricane (immediately preceding the flooding) or 
the subsequent flooding is a good example of this trend. The introduction of a mandatory 
hurricane insurance scheme would substantially alleviate the uncertainties currently faced by 




It is widely accepted that the cost of hurricanes can be substantially reduced if the owners take 
appropriate preventive measures. The topic of which type of low cost changes to existing 
buildings can best reduce the cost of hurricanes is currently being intensively researched, but 
the  evidence  available  is  clear:  when  it  comes  to  a  direct  hit  by  a  major  hurricane,  the 
destruction of the building is practically certain. However, this scenario applies only to a 
relatively small fraction of the properties damaged by hurricanes. When it comes to lower 
wind speeds, a lot can be done with simple measures, whose costs are (substantially) lower 
than the expected benefits.  
 
For new buildings the implementation of more severe building regulations would, of course, 
seem a natural response to an increase in hurricane activity.   
 
It  is  widely  accepted  that  the  implementation  of  such  cost  reducing  measures  also  has 
substantial positive external effects. The better one house resists the winds, the lower the 
chance of the neighbouring houses being hit by its debris and the better the wind protection 
they get from the neighbouring buildings. The existence of a state run hurricane insurance 
scheme can improve the incentives to invest in prevention in several ways.  
 
First by implementing an appropriate system of premium rebates it can give the house-owners 
strong financial incentives to invest in preventive measures. As compared to private insurance 
providers it has two major advantages in this respect:  
 
- The house-owner has the certainty that in the event of a sale the next owner will continue to 
benefit from the same premium rebates (there is only one insurance provider). Investing into 
preventive activities is thus financially more attractive. (It increases the resale value of the 
property). 
 
-  When  determining,  what  is  the  “appropriate”  financial  incentive  to  provide,  the  unique 
insurance  provider  will  also  take  into  account  the  expected  reduction  in  damages  to 
neighbouring buildings (the externality). This is not the case for the individual insurer active 
on a competitive insurance market.  
 
Second  it  is much  more cost efficient to  implement  information campaigns  (e.g.  through 
newspapers, TV etc) if one knows that a large fraction (100%) of the population one reaches 
is ones own customer.  
 
Third the fact that adequate building codes exist is unfortunately no guarantee that they will 
also be implemented. In Switzerland the mandatory state owned insurance providers not only 
participate in the drawing up of residential zoning plans, they also collaborate closely with the   15 
construction  industry  to  make  sure  that  the  building  codes  are  respected.  Their  financial 
incentive to do so is, of course, the future cost savings in terms of reduced claims payments.  
 
 
D Financial situation  
 
As mentioned above, any insurance scheme taking on the hurricane risk of the whole of 
Florida will, of course, be in a critical financial situation in the first few years of its existence. 
It could try to reduce this risk by taking out extensive cover on the re-insurance market. 
However, the more it goes down this road the less reserves it can accumulate (in expected 
terms). If it does keep a substantial part of the risks on its own books, and a major catastrophe 
does strike in the first few years, its reserves will not be sufficient to cover its costs.   
 
Even now this is an argument that is being frequently put forward to criticise the existence of 
Citizens [c.f. von Ungern-Sternberg (2007)] and to a lesser extent the FHCF.  
 
The most obvious way to address this problem is to adopt the same mechanisms that have 
already been put in place to allow both Citizens and the FHCF to cover their deficits. The 
mandatory hurricane insurance scheme should be given the possibility to cover its deficits by 
levying surcharges (assessments). Just as for the case of Citizens, these surcharges should be 
limited in any given year so as not to impose excessively high unexpected costs on the home 
owners. Should these assessments prove insufficient the rest should be covered by issuing 
state guaranteed bonds.  
 
The necessity to resort to such assessments should be smaller than is currently the case for 
Citizens. Indeed, while Citizens’ customers are to be found mainly among the highest risk 
groups, the mandatory state hurricane insurance scheme would have a much more balanced 
and diversified risk portfolio.  
 
Furthermore since even in the current situation Citizens can levy assessments on all home 
owners, the situation for the low risk customers would not change much.   
 
There are good reasons to believe that the good risks also will end up being financially better 
off  than  in the  current  situation.  In  the  last  two  decades  several  sometimes  large  private 
insurance companies have declared bankruptcy when faced with the costs of a major disaster. 
The best known example is the Poe Insurance company, which went bankrupt in the aftermath 
of the 2005 hurricane season, leaving the State Guaranty Association with a bill of around 
$750 million. There is widespread belief that some of the small insurance companies that have 
bought up parts of Citizens’ portfolio in recent years may well have a similar fate the next 
time  a  major  hurricane  strikes.  The  pattern  is  simple:  An  insurance  company  rapidly 
accumulating a high risk portfolio can make good money and pay out handsome dividends to 
its shareholder if it is lucky enough to have no major disaster in the first few years. The initial 
investment  is  thus  rapidly  recuperated.  When  a  major  event  does  occur  the  assets  are 
insufficient to cover the liabilities and the Guaranty fund is left to cover the losses. The 
necessary funds are, of course, raised through assessments on all the home owners.  
 
This highlights a further major advantage of the state monopoly insurers. Since there are no 
shareholders, the premium income cannot be paid out in the form of dividends and/or share 
buybacks. Furthermore, management compensations are supervised by the state. As a result, 
the premium income paid in the past is certain to be available when a catastrophe strikes.    16 
 
One  caveat  should,  however,  be  noted  in  this  respect.  It  is  essential  that  the  Hurricane 
insurance should be organised in such a way that its accounting and finances are clearly 
separated form the rest of the States finances. If this is not done, there is a real danger that the 
reserves of the insurance company might be used to cover the states deficits in other domains.  
 
This is in fact what occurred when the Consorcio in Spain was given its autonomous structure 
in  1990.    The  price  of  its  greater  independence  was  that  the  Consorcio  had  to  leave  its 
accumulated reserves with the ministry of finance, and start again from zero.  
 
  
E Premium structure - the precision of the models.  
 
The exposure to hurricanes is of course very different depending on the location of the house, 
the  type  of  construction  etc.  To  have  any  chance  of  political  acceptability  the  premium 
structure  of  the  mandatory  hurricane  insurance  scheme  must  take  these  differences  of 
exposure into account. An obvious point of departure would be to use the expected claims 
costs of one of the existing hurricane models as a reference point. It is, however, undeniable 
that  these  models  are  by  no  means  precise.  It  thus  seems  reasonable  that  the  premium 
structure should be adapted every 5 years or so to take into account the effective costs of 
hurricanes over the preceding period.  
 
Similarly, once the reserves of the hurricane insurance have reached an adequate level the 
home owners should receive premium rebates. While it is certainly useful for the hurricane 
insurance scheme to have an adequate level of reserves, there is no reason why the insurance 
should be able to accumulate huge levels of reserves at the cost of the home owners. To the 
contrary: one of the major advantages of a mandatory insurance scheme is the possibility to 
cover the costs of catastrophic events through ex post assessments rather than through the 
accumulation of huge and potentially unnecessary reserves.  
 
 
F Competition on the Florida property insurance market.  
 
 
It should be emphasised that the creation of a monopoly hurricane insurance should lead to 
additional savings for the customers that stem from a more indirect source. Several major 
insurance companies have massively reduced their exposure to the property insurance market 
in Florida, because they do not want the exposure to the hurricane risks.  
 
Well known examples are "State Farm Group" which reduced its market share from 30.5% in 
1992 to 20.1% in the year 2000 and "Allstate Insurance Group" which reduced its market 
share from 20.4% in 1992 to 11.2% in the year 2000. The main reason for this massive 
reduction in market share was the cost of the high hurricane risk. Once the hurricane risk is 
transferred to a mandatory state insurance scheme, the insurance companies would have every 
incentive to once again increase their exposure in the other more traditional (and less risky 
domains) of property insurance in Florida such as fire, theft, water damage etc. This increase 
in competition should exert downward pressure on the premium level in these other traditional 
domains.  
 
5 Conclusion    17 
 
The  empirical  evidence  from  several  European  countries  showing  that  mandatory  state 
operated insurance schemes can provide efficient global cover against the consequences of 
natural  catastrophes  spans  several  decades.  The  evidence  that  the  most  exposed  Florida 
properties are not getting a cost efficient insurance cover from the private insurance industry 
is just as convincing. Not only are the home-owners faced with premiums that substantially 
exceed  their  expected  loss  costs;  when  a  hurricane  does  strike  the  process  of  obtaining 
adequate compensation from the insurance companies can become a nightmare. That is, of 
course, if the insurer does not declare bankruptcy and lets the Guaranty Fund (the Florida 
house-owners) foot the bill.  
 
The purpose of this paper was to set out the advantages for the Florida house-owners, if the 
legislator were to introduce a mandatory state run hurricane insurance system along the lines 
of the institutional settings that have proven their efficiency in Europe.  
 
We have emphasised that the mandatory nature of the system is one of the key corner-stones 
to its success. As long as the system is voluntary, it will be the private insurance companies 
which reap most of the benefits of the system: either in the form of excessive compensations 
for their sales efforts (c.f. the NFIP) or in the form of “cream skimming” where the state is 
left holding most of the bad risks (c.f. Citizens).  
 
The  State  of  Florida  has  already  introduced  a system  of  assessments, which  allows  both 
Citizens and the FHCF to cover potential deficits by levying ex post surcharges on all the 
Florida house-owners. This possibility is a necessary prerequisite for getting a mandatory 
hurricane insurance system started. The scheme would not have sufficient reserves if Florida 
were to suffer a bad hurricane season in the fist few years of its existence.  
 
However, the European examples show that in the long run, the mandatory state run systems 
are able to provide a much better insurance cover at considerably lower costs. The reasons 
they can do this are straightforward:  
 
- Their sales and loss adjustment costs are considerably lower.  
-  They  have  much  stronger  incentives  to  develop  and  implement  an  efficient  strategy  of 
damage prevention.  
- They use their premium and interest income to pay for their customers’ losses rather than 
distributing them in the form of dividends, share buybacks and inflated executive salaries.  
 
The Florida policy maker has already gone some way in the right direction with the creation 
of both Citizens and the FHCF.  So far, however, he has not had the necessary courage to take 
the final essential step and make the participation in a state run insurance scheme mandatory.  
 
Just a few years ago, many politicians thought they could defend the private interests of the 
insurance industry by appealing to the blind faith in the advantages of a “free competitive 
market” over any state run solution. Recent economic events have more than shaken peoples 
belief in the advantages of unregulated markets. The question, what is the appropriate level of 
state regulation is fast moving to the top of the political (and scientific) agenda. As regards the 
insurance  against  natural  catastrophes  the  empirical  evidence  is  overwhelming.  From  the 
perspective of the house-owner, a mandatory state operated insurance scheme is far more 
efficient than any of the other mixed solution being experimented with. All that is missing is 
the political lobby to implement it.    18 
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 (frame)   
 Building 
(masonry)   
Cost 
(average) 
clay  2.35  0.27  0.24 
        
6'718'058'335  
           
3'373'016'520   0.26 
leon  2.38  0.21  0.2 
        
9'486'895'233  
           
3'276'973'193   0.21 
duval  2.67  0.27  0.24 
       
25'387'956'407  
         
15'982'550'722   0.26 
lake  2.7  1.84  1.7 
        
4'276'974'972  
         
14'455'493'018   1.73 
sumter  2.72  1.72  1.52 
        
2'776'738'226  
           
2'833'317'434   1.62 
Alachua  2.76  0.295  0.26 
        
5'867'396'014  
           
3'964'177'264   0.28 
saint johns  2.79  0.45  0.44 
       
10'494'716'186  
           
4'837'658'585   0.45 
marion  2.9  1.54  1.3 
        
4'014'489'653  
         
11'448'654'073   1.36 
orange  2.91  1.97  1.64 
       
11'059'869'829  
         
51'028'857'588   1.70 
seminole  2.92  1.78  1.52 
        
4'972'714'484  
         
19'386'008'463   1.57 
flagler  2.95  1.89  1.51 
        
1'201'778'933  
           
6'461'872'755   1.57 
columbia  2.96  0.23  0.21 
        
1'081'480'120  
             
743'583'410   0.22 
Baker  2.97  0.22  0.2 
           
415'908'857  
             
230'003'788   0.21 
osceola  2.97  2.02  1.74 
        
3'239'849'501  
         
11'765'170'109   1.80 
nassau  3.07  0.24  0.2 
        
3'216'317'029  
           
1'048'871'295   0.23 
jefferson  3.11  0.19  0.17 
           
348'171'573  
               
98'551'816   0.19 
bradford  3.17  0.24  0.22 
           
298'280'563  
             
256'816'127   0.23 
putnam  3.22  0.38  0.34 
           
981'563'861  
             
927'882'234   0.36 
jackson  3.3  0.29  0.26 
           
920'546'314  
             
396'265'072   0.28 
madison  3.34  0.2  0.18 
           
299'346'216  
             
117'145'364   0.19 
citrus  3.4  1.71  1.46 
        
1'188'566'069  
           
7'469'043'212   1.49 
suwannee  3.46  0.19  0.17 
           
591'659'058  
             
297'260'499   0.18 
union  3.48  0.26  0.24 
           
117'443'982  
               
99'599'257   0.25 
polk  3.49  2.27  1.9 
        
4'726'840'271  
         
22'310'096'978   1.96 
volusia  3.5  1.91  1.6 
        
6'663'838'310  
         
21'029'514'044   1.67 
calhoun  3.54  0.35  0.32 
           
173'258'472  
               
89'147'696   0.34 
liberty  3.56  0.28  0.25 
            
91'171'266  
               
42'565'155   0.27 
gilchrist  3.57  0.36  0.32 
           
161'032'227  
             
141'390'587   0.34 
highlands  3.62  2.44  2.05 
           
593'783'329  
           
4'155'520'766   2.10 
washington  3.7  0.6  0.53 
           
429'123'788  
             
165'616'903   0.58 
lafayette  3.71  0.26  0.24 
            
67'973'812  
               
39'197'602   0.25 
gadsen  3.78  0.21  0.19 
           
902'693'249  
             
340'689'579   0.20 
hamilton  3.78  0.17  0.16 
           
153'656'986  
               
62'303'689   0.17 
hillsborough  3.81  2.25  1.85 
       
10'599'994'068  
         
50'445'716'013   1.92 
manatee  3.87  2.77  2.19 
        
2'773'877'141  
         
17'767'992'760   2.27   22 
desoto  3.96  2.62  2.21 
           
258'687'212  
             
624'586'032   2.33 
taylor  3.97  0.33  0.29 
           
369'183'162  
             
156'193'400   0.32 
levy  4.02  0.43  0.37 
           
449'375'821  
             
555'247'276   0.40 
hardee  4.08  2.47  2.05 
           
170'639'184  
             
400'467'160   2.18 
sarasota  4.14  2.72  2.25 
        
3'771'044'002  
         
24'679'412'285   2.31 
holmes  4.2  0.45  0.4 
           
275'022'285  
             
109'735'581   0.44 
hendry  4.22  3.29  2.78 
           
294'931'981  
             
549'722'012   2.96 
wakulla  4.24  0.31  0.28 
           
943'920'311  
             
197'973'852   0.30 
okeechobee  4.29  2.69  2.25 
           
302'026'216  
             
778'302'284   2.37 
hernando  4.32  1.81  1.58 
        
1'260'673'218  
           
8'491'895'396   1.61 
brevard  4.33  2.44  2.03 
        
6'508'660'842  
         
24'966'297'878   2.11 
santa rosa  4.34  1.56  1.42 
        
6'739'951'901  
           
1'993'892'319   1.53 
charlotte  4.47  3.23  2.47 
        
1'380'890'763  
         
11'466'060'856   2.55 
glades  4.48  2.94  2.45 
            
41'330'895  
               
69'934'924   2.63 
lee  4.49  3.68  2.77 
        
6'392'542'695  
         
37'754'089'412   2.90 
okaloosa  4.53  1.73  1.44 
        
8'448'572'055  
           
2'647'455'834   1.66 
dixie  4.72  0.44  0.34 
           
177'559'184  
               
76'383'787   0.41 
bay  4.83  1.18  0.91 
        
6'094'211'708  
           
2'490'734'564   1.10 
collier  4.93  3.88  3.12 
        
2'921'134'155  
         
23'128'288'225   3.21 
saint lucie  4.97  4.28  2.93 
        
3'196'870'867  
         
11'637'116'747   3.22 
escambia  5.01  1.77  1.55 
       
10'107'315'397  
           
3'013'282'248   1.72 
pinellas  5.13  2.48  1.93 
        
8'702'892'046  
         
36'494'762'183   2.04 
pasco  5.15  2.01  1.65 
        
3'090'357'478  
         
18'913'651'244   1.70 
martin  5.63  4.76  3.26 
        
2'436'477'711  
           
7'580'561'238   3.62 
indian river  5.67  3.49  2.89 
        
2'714'207'022  
           
6'703'319'834   3.06 
walton  6.29  1.13  0.89 
        
3'892'555'424  
             
784'537'926   1.09 
palm beach  6.48  5.76  3.95 
        
8'124'478'304  
         
73'419'210'926   4.13 
broward  7.2  7.03  4.61 
        
2'419'357'706  
         
72'950'012'666   4.69 
gulf  7.36  0.85  0.71 
           
714'729'116  
             
124'325'981   0.83 
franklin  8.13  1.5  1.35 
           
918'992'719  
               
88'552'766   1.49 
miami-dade  10.57  7.57  4.87 
        
2'287'220'472  
         
74'375'858'571   4.95 
monroe  30.7  9.2  9.4 
        
2'435'626'347  
           
4'362'430'418   9.33 
statewide  4.73  2.03  2.78 
     
133'128'794'508  
       
305'140'163'452   2.55 
 